@@ -9,20 +9,29 @@ This is part of a series on [Tidwell's Questions](https://twitter.com/miketwenty
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## The Question
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- If we look at the real world example of Monero:
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+ Supposedly (acording to Melvin)...
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- 1 . Market cap = 3 billion
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- 2 . Daily fees = 1 thousand
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+ If we look at the real world example of Monero:
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+ 1. Market cap = 3 billion
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+ 2. Daily fees = 1 thousand
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+ A self-interested actor (or algorithm) would always take (1), over (2).
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- A self-interested actor (or algorithm) would always take (1), over (2).
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+ The chain gets terminated, and users rugged.
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+ So, why will fees be enough to deter theft? It doesn't seem to add up!
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- The chain gets terminated, and users rugged.
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## The Answer
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+ Actually, it adds up just fine. Fee revenues will be way, way more than total coins "locked" to a drivechain.
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+ Secondly, even if it didn't add up -- that would just mean that Bitcoin L1 is doomed as well.
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### 1. If DC Breaks, Bitcoin Probably Breaks Also
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- Yes, Drivechain uses a "fees only" model -- L2 cannot print any new coins.
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+ Drivechain uses a "fees only" model -- L2 cannot print any new coins.
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Eventually, Bitcoin's L1 will share this fate. That's Bitcoin's long run security model. So, if it doesn't work, we had better learn now!
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