Verify WebAuthn Signature Encoding #388
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nlordell
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This PR adds logic to verify the WebAuthn signature encoding length. This is done so that encodings have a strict upper bound (determined by the 'standard' ABI encoding of the
WebAuthn.Signaturestruct) on the length of the signatures.This prevents a potential griefing attack where the signature that is sent to an ERC-4337 bundler could be arbitrarily padded with additional
0s (which would have trivial increases to thecalldatasizewith onchain LZMA calldata decompression that already exists) while causing accounts to pay significantly more in gas costs for signature verification (bounded by theverificationGasLimit).